EXCISE DEPARTMENT OF STATE E&S

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

6444

S/S

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MR
June 25, 1981
REVIEWED BY F Schmalzer DATE 2/26/87
RDS☐or XDS☐EXT. DATE
TS AUTH. REASON(S)
ENDORSE EXISTING MARKINGS ☐
DECLASSIFIED☐ RELEASABLE☐
RELEASE DENIED☒ in part
PA or FOI EXEMPTIONS b-5

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Secretary

THRU: T - James L. Buckley

FROM: H - Richard Fairbanks
NEA - Nicholas A. Veliotes
PM - Robert Blackwill, Acting

SUBJECT: Congressional Strategy on AWACS During Period of Informal Notification

The unique situation which we face with the AWACS package sale to Saudi Arabia will require unusual activity on our part during the 20-day informal notification. Normally, such a period is not accompanied by any active consultation or lobbying by the Executive branch, but merely provides an opportunity for Congressional staff to distribute the information we provide to Members. Given the high level of interest this case has aroused already, we believe we will need to conduct a full and wide-ranging operation to solicit support for our proposal. Waiting until the formal notification period before actively engaging the issue could critically damage our prospects. The White House, State and Defense will need to coordinate their efforts closely, under Richard Allen's overall supervision.

Attached at Tab 1 is a draft of the informal notifications on the four components of the package. We must expect that despite the classification, the details of both the package and our justifications will quickly reach the media and opponents of our proposals will intensify their attack during this period. As can be seen by the evident support which Senator Packwood has obtained for his letter to the President (Tab 2), we will have a very difficult time trying to keep Members from taking a position at an early date.

As Packwood's letter demonstrates, moreover, we face a tough, uphill battle. Immediate, intense, and sustained White House involvement will be necessary if we are ultimately to succeed on the Hill.

To date, we have focussed our efforts on keeping Members from committing against us. We have had technical briefings conducted by DoD, responded to Congessional letters and have had extensive personal contacts with Members. We believe that

as soon as the informal notification package is transmitted to Congress, we should begin an intensive consultation process. (Tab 3) This should include briefings of staffers, Members and undertaking a large scale public relations campaign.

b5

While we obviously cannot ignore the House, we believe that we should concentrate our forces and time on the Senate where we have a much more realistic chance of winning this battle. This is not to say that we will not continue to work with the leadership of the House where possible, but we cannot afford to waste our time at the risk of missing an opportunity in the Senate. We plan to have Ambassador Neumann return on consultation to assist in this effort.

We will be coming back to you with memoranda on specific Members of Congress we recommend that you see. We foresee that you could effectively lead our efforts through a wide variety of personal and informal as well as in official contacts with key Members.

Attachments:

Tab 1 - Draft Informal Notification Package
Tab 2 - Senator Packwood letter to the President
Tab 3 - Consultation Game Plan

Drafted: H:GMartin:blo/#1361A
6/24/81, Ext. 28728

Clearance: H:ADrischler
NEA/ARP:RPelletreau

In reply refer to:
I-1714/81

Honorable Richard R. Burt
Director, Bureau of Politico-
Military Affairs
Department of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Rick:

(C) At the end of March I provided you four draft advance notices to Congress (81-CQ, 81-CT, 81-CU, and 81-CV) and military justifications pertaining to Saudi Arabia. Based upon additional information provided by the U.S. Air Force I am forwarding these updated documents herewith for your consideration.

Sincerely,

SIGNED

Attachments

ERNEST CRAVES
LIEUTENANT GENERAL, USA
DIRECTOR
DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY

CLASSIFIED BY NASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

In reply refer to:
I-1714/81

Dr. Hans Binnendijk
Professional Staff Member
Committee on Foreign Relations
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Mr. John J. Brady, Jr.
Chief of Staff
Committee on Foreign Affairs
House of Representatives
Washington, D.C. 20515

Mr. Rhett B. Dawson
Staff Director
Committee on Armed Forces
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

Dear Dr. Binnendijk:
Mr. Brady:
Mr. Dawson:

By letter dated 18 February 1976, the Director, Defense Security Assistance Agency, indicated that you would be advised of possible transmittals to Congress of information as required by Section 36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act. At the instruction of the Department of State, I wish to provide the following advance notification.

The Department of State is considering an offer to a Middle Eastern country tentatively estimated to cost in excess of $25 million.

Sincerely,

Attachments

CONFIDENTIAL WHEN WITH ATTACHMENTS

TRANSMITTAL No. 81-CV

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE SECTION 36(b) STATEMENTS
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

a. (C) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia

b. (C) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Eight Boeing 707 aerial refueling aircraft, including an initial purchase of six aircraft and an option to purchase two additional aircraft, three years supply of spares and support equipment and three years of contractor maintenance, training and logistics support in Saudi Arabia.

c. (C) Estimated Value(s) of this Case: $975 million

d. (C) Description of Total Program of which this Case is a Part:
Same as b above.

e. (C) Estimated Value of Total Program of which this Case is a Part:
Same as c above.

f. (C) Prior Related Cases, if any:
None

g. (C) Military Department: Air Force (SKA)

h. (C) Estimated Date Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) Ready for Formal Notification to Congress:

i. (C) Date Advance Notification Delivered to Congress:

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

MILITARY JUSTIFICATION

(C) Saudi Arabia - Aerial Refueling Aircraft

(C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested the purchase of eight Boeing 707 aerial refueling aircraft, including an initial purchase of six aircraft and an option to purchase two additional aircraft, three years supply of spares and support equipment and three years of contractor maintenance, training and logistics support in Saudi Arabia at an estimated cost of $975 million.

(C) This sale is consistent with the stated U.S. policy of assisting other nations to provide for their own self-defense by allowing the transfer of reasonable amounts of defense articles and services. It will demonstrate the continuing willingness of the United States to support the Saudi Arabian effort to improve the security of the country through modernization of the Saudi armed forces.

(C) The purchase of the aerial refueling aircraft will enhance the Saudi air defense capability by increasing the range and time aloft of the Saudi F-15 aircraft. In view of the size of the country, the few bases at which the F-15 aircraft will be located, and the increased regional threat, the capability to prolong the endurance of interceptor aircraft is essential to the defense of the Kingdom. These same aerial tankers can be used to refuel the E-3A aircraft also requested by Saudi Arabia, likewise extending their time aloft.

(C) The sale of this equipment and support will not affect the basic military balance in the region. Both Israel and Iran have aerial refueling capabilities.

(C) Approximately 200-300 contractor personnel will be required to provide initial in-country support. The contract will be for support for three years. Follow-on contractors beyond the initial contract period are expected, but the number of U.S. contractors should decrease as the Royal Saudi Air Force becomes trained to perform maintenance.

(U) The prime contractor will be the Boeing Aerospace Company of Seattle, Washington.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this sale. Procurement will be from new production.

CLASSIFIED BY NASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE SECTION 36(b) STATEMENTS
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

a. (C) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia

b. (C) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase: One hundred and one ship sets of conformal fuel tanks (CFT) for the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) F-15 aircraft. The CFTs are streamlined fuel tanks, two per aircraft, which afix to the sides of the F-15 fuselage. The sale would include spare parts, support equipment, training equipment, publications, and other related support for the CFTs.

c. (C) Estimated Value(s) of this Case: $110 million

d. (C) Description of Total Program of which this Case is a Part: CFTs provide an additional equipment capability to the RSAF F-15 program (PEACE SUN). Included in the PEACE SUN program are the purchase of 62 F-15 aircraft, spares, support equipment, flight simulators, basic munitions (AIM-9P-3 and AIM-7F air-to-air missiles), technical data, U.S. technical and pilot training, and construction of technical facilities. Also included are 42 months of in-country contractor maintenance, training, and logistics support.

e. (C) Estimated Value of Total Program of which this Case is a Part: $5 billion

f. (C) Prior Related Cases, if any:
(1) FMS Case SFA (PEACE SUN I): 60 F-15 aircraft, spares, support equipment, training, devices, and air-to-air munitions. Case value $1.6 billion, accepted by Saudi Arabian Government 13 July 1978.

(a) SFA Amendment 1: Additional logistics support. Case value $426 million, accepted by SAG 14 September 1979.

(b) SFA Amendment 2: Additional logistics support. Case value $534 million, accepted by SAG 24 February 1981.

(c) SFA Amendment 3: Additional engines. Case value $70 million; incorporated into Amendment 2.

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

10 February 1980.

(3) YBA (PEACE SUN III): Contractor technical support services and training for in-country support of the RSAF F-15s. Case value $964 million, accepted by SAG 7 June 1980.

(4) TDA (PEACE SUN IV): CONUS F-15 training for RSAF pilots and maintenance personnel. Case value $9 million, accepted by SAG 15 February 1980.

(5) SGK (PEACE SUN V): Two replacement F-15C aircraft to be stored in CONUS until needed to replace any of the original 60 when destroyed. Case value $47 million, accepted by SAG 25 November 1980.

g. (C) Military Department: Air Force (SFA, Amendment #4)

h. (C) Estimated Date Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) Ready for Formal Notification to Congress:

i. (C) Date Advance Notification Delivered to Congress:

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Saudi Arabia - Conformal Fuel Tanks for F-15 Aircraft

(C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested the amendment of an existing sales agreement under which 60 F-15 aircraft are being provided to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) to include 101 ship sets of conformal fuel tanks (CFT) (202 tanks) and related spare parts, support equipment, training equipment, publications, and other support at an estimated cost of $110 million.

(C) This sale will contribute significantly to American foreign policy and national security objectives by helping to improve the security of a friendly country of vital interest to the United States. Enhancement of the defensive capabilities of Saudi Arabia will help ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States and other non-communist countries.

(C) Recent military developments (Iraq-Iran War, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) have accented the urgency for enhancing the RSAF F-15 capabilities, particularly in providing the aircraft with more endurance to improve the Saudi air defense capability. The Kingdom is a relatively large geographical area, and CFTs would enable the Saudis to fly sorties from bases other than those directly under attack. With a relatively small number of aircraft (105 F-5s and 60 F-15s), CFTs will increase the time aloft of each flight, an important factor in defending the Kingdom.

(C) The introduction of CFTs in Saudi Arabia will not affect the regional military balance. Israel has CFTs on its F-15s, and both Israel and Iran have aerial refueling capabilities.

(U) The prime contractor will be the McDonnell Douglas Corporation of St. Louis, Missouri, which is the aircraft manufacturer for F-15s.

(U) No additional U.S. Government or contractor personnel will be required in Saudi Arabia to implement this sale. Sufficient fuel specialists will be in-country under existing contracts to provide support for the CFTs.

(U) There will be no adverse impact on U.S. defense readiness as a result of this proposed sale. The production rate for the USAF is low enough to allow phase-in of another customer to procure CFTs concurrently.

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia

(C) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:
A quantity of 1,177 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles with associated spare parts and special test and support equipment.

c. (C) Estimated Value(s) of this Case: $200 million

d. (C) Description of Total Program of which this Case is a Part:
This sale will become a part of the overall PEACE SUN program which was for the sale to Saudi Arabia of 62 F-15 aircraft with spares, support equipment, flight simulators, air-to-air missiles (AIM-9P-3 and AIM-7F), technical data, training in the CONUS of Saudi maintenance technicians and aircrews, and the construction of technical support facilities. Also included in the overall program are 42 months of contractor maintenance, training, and logistics support in Saudi Arabia.

e. (C) Estimated Value of Total Program of which this Case is a Part:
$5 billion

f. (C) Prior Related Cases, if any:
(1) FMS Case SFA (PEACE SUN I): 60 F-15 aircraft, spares, support equipment, training, devices, and air-to-air missiles. Case value $1.6 billion, accepted by Saudi Arabian Government 13 July 1978.

(a) SFA, Amendment 1: Additional logistics support to the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) F-15 program. Amendment value: $426 million; accepted by SAG 14 September 1979.

(b) SFA, Amendment 2: Additional logistics support to the RSAF F-15 program, including funding for the retrofit of RSAF AIM-7F missiles to include Product Optimization Program (POP) improvements. Amendment value: $534 million; accepted by SAG 24 February 1981.

(c) SFA, Amendment 3: Spare engines for RSAF F-15s. Amendment value: $70 million; cancelled as it was incorporated into Amendment 2.

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

10 February 1980.

(3) YBA (PEACE SUN III): Contractor technical support services and training for in-country support of the RSAF F-15s. Case value: $964 million; accepted by SAG 7 June 1980.

(4) TDA (PEACE SUN IV): Training of RSAF F-15 aircrews and maintenance personnel in the CONUS. Case value: $9 million; accepted by SAG 15 February 1980.

(5) SGK (PEACE SUN V): Two additional F-15C aircraft to be stored in CONUS as replacement for RSAF F-15s that may be lost. Case value: $47 million; accepted by SAG 25 November 1980.

g. (C) Military Department: Air Force (SFA, Amendment #5)

h. (C) Estimated Date Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) Ready for Formal Notification to Congress:

i. (C) Date Advance Notification Delivered to Congress:

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) Saudi Arabia - AIM-9L Missiles

(C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested the purchase of 1,177 AIM-9L air-to-air missiles for use on Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) F-15 aircraft together with related spare parts and special test and support equipment at an estimated cost of $200 million.

(C) Saudi Arabia is a valued ally whose security is of vital interest to the United States. The sale of these missiles will contribute to the foreign policy objectives of the United States by enhancing the ability of the Saudi Arabian Government to defend the Kingdom. Enhanced defense capabilities will help to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil to the United States and other non-communist countries.

(C) Recent military developments in the Middle East (Iran-Iraq war, Soviet invasion of Afghanistan) have increased the potential for hostile action against Saudi Arabia. This accentuates the urgency of enhancing the RSAF F-15 capabilities, especially as concerns short range air-to-air defense. The acquisition of the AIM-9L by Saudi Arabia will not upset the regional balance, as Israel has also purchased the AIM-9L missile.

(C) Saudi Arabia needs the AIM-9L missile because of a legitimate requirement for RSAF F-15s to be able to intercept high speed hostile aircraft which could threaten the oil fields with minimum warning. The missile has the capability of a head-on attack against hostile aircraft, which obviates the need for Saudi interceptors to lose vital time in maneuvering into a rear attack position as required by the AIM-9P missiles currently in the RSAF inventory. Therefore, the AIM-9L significantly enhances the capability of the RSAF to intercept and destroy attacking aircraft before they can damage vital resources. RSAF personnel will be able to absorb this missile into the inventory both from the operational and maintenance perspectives, as they have already demonstrated capabilities to operate and maintain earlier AIM-9 series missiles.

(U) The AIM-9L missiles proposed for sale will come from U.S. inventory on a one-for-one exchange basis as the newer version AIM-9M missiles are delivered from new production. The prime contractor for the AIM-9M missile is Raytheon Company of Lowell, Massachusetts.

(U) It is estimated that approximately nine additional munitions support contractor personnel will be required for a period of about three years, due to the increased size of the overall RSAF air-to-air missile inventory.

(U) As noted, the AIM-9L missiles will be provided from U.S. inventory, and equal number of AIM-9M missiles will be produced using funds from this FMS case to replace them. Under these circumstances, no impact is anticipated on U.S. readiness.

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

ADVANCE NOTIFICATION OF POSSIBLE SECTION 36(b) STATEMENTS
FOREIGN MILITARY SALES

a. (C) Prospective Purchaser: Saudi Arabia

b. (C) Description and Quantity or Quantities of Articles or Services under Consideration for Purchase:
Five E-3A aircraft, associated spares and support equipment, three years of contractor provided logistics support and training in Saudi Arabia, CONUS training provided by USAF and/or the contractor, a facility site survey, and the design, construction, and supply of required AWACS related ground based Command, Control, and Communications (C^3) facilities and equipment, including an appropriate number of ground radars.

c. (C) Estimated Value(s) of this Case: $4 billion

d. (C) Description of Total Program of which this Case is a Part:
Same as b above.

e. (C) Estimated Value of Total Program of which this Case is a Part:
$4 billion

f. (C) Prior Related Cases, if any:
None

g. (C) Military Department: Air Force (SJA)

h. (C) Estimated Date Letter of Offer/Acceptance (LOA) Ready for Formal Notification to Congress:

i. (C) Date Advance Notification Delivered to Congress:

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

CONFIDENTIAL

(C) The Government of Saudi Arabia has requested the purchase of five E-3A aircraft, associated spares and support equipment, three years of contractor provided logistics support and training in Saudi Arabia, USAF and/or contractor provided CONUS training, a facility site survey, and provision for the design, construction, and supply of required AWACS-related ground based Command, Control, and Communications (C^3) facilities and equipment, including an appropriate number of ground radars, at an estimated aggregate cost of $4 billion. (An additional sale may be requested for design and construction services to provide ground facilities to support the aircraft. This request, if received, will be notified separately.)

(C) This sale will contribute to the foreign policy and national security objectives of the United States by enhancing Saudi Arabia's ability to respond to hostile aircraft threats with organic defense forces, thereby contributing to Middle East stability and reducing the probability of a major power confrontation in the region. Further, it will help to ensure an uninterrupted flow of oil from the Kingdom. Enhancement of Saudi Arabian defensive capabilities in a regional context will be a very important contribution to Saudi and U.S. interests in the region.

(C) This sale will not have an adverse impact on the regional military balance. The E-2C, an airborne surveillance platform similar to the E-3A, is currently in the inventory of Israel. Ground radar systems are presently in the inventory of most of Saudi Arabia's neighbors.

(C) Saudi Arabia currently lacks the early warning required for an effective air defense network. The E-3A aircraft and related ground based C^3 equipment, combined with a small number of ground radars, are the most effective means of providing the early warning required for effective air defense. Five E-3A aircraft will allow the Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) to provide continuous coverage during short periods of heightened tension or hostilities. Use of an airborne platform gives the RSAF the flexibility to move this capability to any area of their border that may be threatened.

(U) The Boeing Aerospace Company of Seattle, Washington, is the prime contractor for this proposed sale.

(C) Initially, approximately 410 U.S. contractor personnel will be required in Saudi Arabia in support of this proposed sale to provide logistics support and maintenance training. Approximately 30 U.S. Government personnel will also be required to provide contract oversight and operator training. It is expected that the number of contractor personnel will decrease as the RSAF becomes trained to perform maintenance.

(U) This proposed sale has no impact on U.S. defense readiness as the E-3A will come from new production.

CLASSIFIED BY MASM (DOD 5105.38M) (PART 1, CH G)
DECLASSIFIED ON STATUTORY NOTIFICATION TO CONGRESS
UNLESS REQUIRED OTHERWISE BY COMPETENT AUTHORITY.

BOB PACKWOOD
U.S. Senator for Oregon

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday, June 24, 1981

CONTACT: ETTA FIELEK
202/224-9058

FIFTY-FOUR SENATORS ASK PRESIDENT TO CANCEL SAUDI ARMS SALE

WASHINGTON---A majority of U.S. Senators, led by Senator Bob Packwood, R-Oregon, have asked President Reagan to forego an imminent arms sale to Saudi Arabia.

Fifty-four senators cosigned a letter to the President today, even as the Administration was preparing to notify the Congress of its intent to sell the additional military equipment to Saudi Arabia. The Saudis have requested an enhancement package for F-15 and AWACS planes.

According to the letter, "It is our deep belief that this sale is not in the best interest of the United States, and therefore recommend that you refrain from sending this proposal to the Congress."

Packwood, in gathering support for the message to the President, cited several reasons why the United States should not consider the sale, including the fact that Saudi Arabia doesn't have military personnel to operate and maintain sophisticated planes.

(MORE)

More important, though, is the fact that the Saudis have not chosen a constructive role in the Camp David process. They have displayed a hostility that must be interpreted as their deliberate intention to promote continued instability in the Middle East," the Oregon senator said.

"In addition, the F-15 enhancement and AWACS package would mean providing the Saudis with sophisticated technology that could jeopardize our national security.

"Let's think about which nations have been seriously committed to negotiating peace in the Middle East and which have not shared that commitment," Packwood said.

-30-

The 54 senators' letter to the President with the list of co-signers is attached.

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

June 24, 1981

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. President:

We are writing today to express our deep concern over the Administration's intent to sell the F-15 enhancement and AWACS package to Saudi Arabia. It is our strong belief that this sale is not in the best interest of the United States, and therefore recommend that you refrain from sending this proposal to the Congress.

Cordially,

BOB PACKWOOD

HENRY JACKSON

RUDY BOSCHWITZ

DAVID PRYOR

WILLIAM V. ROTH, JR.

DANIEL INOUYE

ROGER JEPSEN

HOWELL HEFLIN

ARLEN SPECTER

CARL LEVIN



LARRY PRESSLER

JIM SASSER

ALFONSE D'AMATO



DENNIS DeCONCINI



PAULA HAWKINS



WILLIAM PROXMIRE



JOHN HEINZ



LAWTON CHILES



DAVID DURENBERGER

HARRISON A. WILLIAMS, JR.



WILLIAM S. COHEN



WENDELL H. FORD



JOHN C. DANFORTH



BILL BRADLEY



LOWELL P. WEICKER



ALAN DIXON



EDWARD M. KENNEDY



PAUL SARBANES



HOWARD CANNON



GEORGE MITCHELL



CHRISTOPHER J. DODD



JAMES EXON



HOWARD METZENBAUM



DANIEL MOYNIHAN

QUENTIN N. BURDICK



DONALD RIEGLE



THOMAS F. EAGLETON



JOSEPH R. BIDEN

EDWARD ZORINSKY



SPARK M. MATSUNAGA



ORRIN G. HATCH



MAX BAUCUS

ROBERT W. KASTEN, JR.



GARY HART



JOHN GLENN



PAUL TSONGAS



MARK ANDREWS



ALAN CRANSTON



S.I. (SAM) HAYAKAWA



ALAN K. SIMPSON



WALTER D. HUDDLESTON



SLADE GORTON



CHARLES E. GRASSLEY



DAVID L. BOREN

REPUBLICAN CO-SIGNERS OF LETTER

TO THE PRESIDENT

1. ANDREWS
2. BOSCHWITZ
3. COHEN
4. DANFORTH
5. D'AMATO
6. DURENBERGER
7. GORTON
8. GRASSLEY
9. HATCH
10. HAWKINS
11. HAYAKAWA
12. HEINZ
13. JEPSEN
14. KASTEN
15. PACKWOOD
16. PRESSLER
17. ROTH
18. SIMPSON
19. SPECTER
20. WEICKER

DEMOCRATS WHO ARE CO-SIGNERS OF

LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT

1. BAUCUS
2. BIDEN
3. BOREN
4. BRADLEY
5. BURDICK
6. CANNON
7. CHILES
8. CRANSTON
9. DeCONCINI
10. DIXON
11. DODD
12. EAGLETON
13. EXON
14. FORD
15. GLENN
16. HART
17. HEFLIN
18. HUDDLESTON
19. INOUYE
20. JACKSON
21. KENNEDY
22. LEVIN
23. MATSUNAGA
24. METZENBAUM
25. MITCHELL
26. MOYNIHAN
27. PROXMIRE
28. PRYOR
29. RIEGLE
30. SARBANES
31. SASSER
32. TSONGAS
33. WILLIAMS
34. ZORINSKY

It is important that we begin a maximum effort to coincide with the Informal Submission. This effort should focus on three levels: (1) the staff, (2) the Members, and (3) the outside groups. It will require both a well-coordinated effort within the USG and some direction and knowledge of efforts in support of the sale by other governments and the private sector. The overall effort should be targeted at solidifying our base and identifying swing Senators and persuading them to come over to our side.

Staff

The effort to reach staffers frequently pays high dividends. Both the 1978 F-15 sale and the proposed 1977 sale of AWACS to Iran profited immensely from paying attention to the staffers who are charged with briefing their Members on this issue.

Regular briefings should be set up, as they were in these two previous instances, in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. Here staffers in small groups could be briefed on the full details of the informal from our point of view. Those interested in going further should be encouraged to visit both the State Department and the Pentagon and provided with further detail. This will of course require handouts of our policy summary and probably Q's and A's on the major questions. The process of inviting staffers to the White House will isolate those most receptive to our cause who could, in turn, be utilized for purposes of passing this material on the Hill.

Senators

The name of the game is votes, and the key has to be identifying and convincing swing Senators. There is no point spending inordinate amounts of time either attempting to persuade the unconvinceable or preaching to the choir.

There are about 60 Senators who are either not firmly committed against or safely for. We need to work toward a goal of having each of these Senators receive our message personally and in a group or committee context.

A. Committee/group sessions.

-- SFRC (State)
-- Armed Services (DOD)
-- Intelligence (?)
-- Appropriations (? - could be done at subcommittee level)
-- Democrat conservative group (WH)
-- Senate Republican Policy Committee (WH)
-- Senate Republican Steering Committee (WH)
-- All committee chairmen (President)
-- Others (?)

B. Individual Senators.

-- To be contacted as agreed among State-DOD-WH.
-- Additional names as suggested by Howard Baker, or other friends.

House Members

-- Bipartisan leadership (WH)
-- Committees (State/DOD as appropriate)
-- Republican Conference (WH)

Outside Groups

The opposition is extremely well organized. The focus of their effort is constituency-based lobbying of the most potent sort. If we are to have any chance at all, we must consider this effort with a public relations campaign in the country. This will require the active participation of not just the Public Affairs Bureaus at State and DOD, but the external liaison functions in the White House, with the coordination of Elizabeth Dole. We should begin meeting shortly with the public affairs and external liaison people to map out a strategy for taking our message to the country, to coincide with the submission of the Informal.

In addition, elements of the private sector, from major groups, such as the Chamber of Commerce, to trade associations, to individual companies, either will want to weigh in affirmatively or can be encouraged to help. This again should be coordinated between the congressional relations operations and Elizabeth Dole's office.

Finally, we will need at least to stay informed of the activities of interested foreign governments, including the Saudis.

Timing

Day of submission of informal (possible Presidential statement and meeting with bipartisan leadership)
Day 1 - Major speech (possibly by Richard V. Allen)
Day 1 through 7 - Committee briefings and staff briefings commence.
Day 1 through 20 - Briefings with individual Senators.